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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the Irish experience of social partnership at 
organisation level. It argues that three features in particular distin-
guish the Irish case. One is the importance attached to a procedural 
consensus to advance partnership. Another is the stress placed on 
experimental action in the development of these arrangements. A 
third characteristic is the use of an essentially non-legalistic public 
support framework to foster and guide the evolution of enterprise 
partnerships. The paper argues that while these features have merit 
they have not been to overcome fully what is called the partnership 
trilemma. This has caused the spread of organisational partner-
ships to remain stunted. 
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1.   Introduction
1 
 
An emerging theme in the comparative employment relations litera-
ture is that labour market institutions are in a period of transition. 
Economic and social transformations have caused established rules 
and procedures that incorporate people into the world of work to 
lose economic functionality and social coherence: they are unable to 
perform the tasks they were put in place to do (Osterman et al 2001, 
Teague 1999). But while established institutions may not be operat-
ing effectively, new arrangements to govern employment relations 
have yet to reach maturity. Thus, a governance gap prevails in many 
national labour markets: some employment relations institutions are 
not fully in tune with unfolding workplace practices or wider labour 
market patterns. This situation has encouraged new forms of public 
policies for the labour market as well as innovations to organisa-
tional-level employment relations regimes. These reforms, experi-
ments is perhaps a better term, are diverse, but many share the 
common property of seeking to re-connect employer demands for 
high business performance with employee demands for meaningful 
and decent work.  
 
Social partnership is a fertile field of employment relations innova-
tions. A big debate has opened about the meaning and significance 
of this development (Bacon/Storey 2000 and Coupar/Stevens 1998). 
This paper contributes to this debate by examining the Irish experi-
ence of enterprise-based partnerships. The paper is organised as fol-
lows. The first section describes the launch of the enterprise ar-
rangement in Ireland. It highlights the open-ended definition used to 
get activity on this topic off the ground. The following section out-
lines the development of a public support framework designed to 
foster partnership programmes in the absence of constraining legal 
rules. Next, the institutional character of private sector enterprise 
partnerships in Ireland is set out in stylised form. Then some of the 
more important theoretical issues associated the Irish experience are 
explored. The penultimate section analyses the diffusion of enter-
                                                 
1   I would like to thank participants at seminars at Trinity College Dublin and 
National University of Ireland at Galway for critical comments on earlier ver-
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prise partnership in the Irish public sector. The conclusions brings 
together the various arguments developed in the paper. 
 
 
2.   The Launch of Enterprise Partnership in Ireland 
 
Since 1987 the Irish labour market has been governed by a social 
partnership regime (O’Donnell/Thomas 1998). When this first got 
off the ground the main motivation was to govern the wage deter-
mination process so that a coalition could be formed between em-
ployers, trade unions and government to help address the dire eco-
nomic situation that prevail in the country. Thus like many 'tradi-
tional' corporatist deals of the past the emphasis was on organising 
the collective bargaining system so that it was consistent with pre-
vailing government macro-economic priorities (Teague/Donaghey 
2004). But in the mid-nineties, concern emerged that the social 
partnership framework was too 'macro' in orientation, which caused 
employer-trade union interactions at the workforce to remain un-
touched by this principle (Gunnigle 1998). Both employers and 
trade unions supported the creation of 'enterprise partnerships', but 
for different reasons. On the one hand, employers viewed this de-
velopment as a mechanism to improve competitiveness and per-
formance inside organisations. There was much talk of enterprise 
partnerships replicating the 'shared understandings' that had been 
forged between employers and trade unions at the national level in-
side organisations (NESF 1997). By building consensus oriented 
employment relations at the organisation level, enterprise partner-
ship was regarded as an innovation that would pave the way for the 
greater diffusion of new high performance work practices (Gov-
ernment of Ireland 1996, 2000). On the other hand, trade unions en-
visaged enterprise partnerships as the first step towards the long-
standing labour movement aim of creating a system of industrial 
democracy at the workplace. 
 
The first move towards promoting social partnership at enterprise 
level was made in 1996 in the national social agreement named 
‘Partnership 2000’ (P2000). Enterprise partnership was defined as 
 
‘An active relationship based on recognition of a common interest to se-
cure the competitiveness, viability and prosperity of the enterprise. It in-Teague: Social Partnership and the Enterprise 9 
volves a continuing commitment by employees to improvements in quality 
and efficiency; and the acceptance by employers of employees as stake 
holders with rights and interests to be considered in the context of major 
decisions affecting their employment. 
 
[…] Partnership involves common ownership of the resolution of chal-
lenges involving the direct participation of employees/representatives and 
an investment in their training, development and working environment’ 
(Government of Ireland 1996: 52) 
 
An additional clause set out six operational principles that should 
guide the diffusion of enterprise partnership. These were: a focus on 
competitiveness, building on progress to date, no one model of 
partnership, Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and Irish Busi-
ness and Employer Confederation (IBEC) support, voluntarism and 
evaluation and monitoring. The national social agreement that ran 
from 2000-2002, the Programme for Prosperity, further builds on 
the initial definition by identifying nine areas identified as being 
“particularly relevant” in the partnership approach. These are: com-
petitiveness, adaptability, flexibility and innovation in the enter-
prise; better systems of work organisation; training and develop-
ment which is linked to lifelong learning; measures to promote 
equality of opportunity and family friendly working arrangements; 
problem solving and conflict avoidance; occupational safety, health 
and safety issues including physical environment of partnership and 
improvement; information and consultation; time off, facilities and 
training for staff representative; and financial forms of involvement. 
 
From the outset, it was evident that the two core principles lying 
behind the 'Irish' approach to enterprise partnerships. First, such ar-
rangements should be embedded as far as possible in actual devel-
opments in co-operative employment relations. Enterprise partner-
ship cannot be imposed on organisations but ‘owned’ by the various 
constituencies inside the enterprise. Second, the competencies to 
engage in meaningful partnership activity are underdeveloped in 
many organisations. As a result, both employees and managers will 
need training so that they can interact with each other in a partner-
ship way (see O’Donnell/Teague 2000). 10  European Political Economy Review  
 
3.   Promoting Enterprise Partnerships 
 
A common argument in the employment relations literature is that 
without legal rules organisations fight shy of establishing institu-
tionalised bodies such as works councils that seek to advance 
worker involvement. Freeman and Lazear (1995) provide a theo-
retical explanation as to why this is the case. They suggest that em-
ployees and employers may not engage in mutually advantageous 
co-operative interactions even if it is in the self-interest of both to 
do so. This is because a range of negative externalities, mostly in 
the form of information asymmetries, prevents the creation of ade-
quate incentives to introduce institutionalised forms of employee 
involvement. On the one hand, management will vest them with too 
little power. On the other hand, workers will demand more power 
than is considered optimal by managers. As a result, a market fail-
ure emerges that cannot be credibly solved without legal rules. This 
is a tidy argument given plausibility by the evidence that in coun-
tries where there are no mandatory rules that oblige employers to 
create employee involvement institutions at the workplace these ar-
rangements tend to be underdeveloped. 
 
Yet in Ireland using the law to diffuse enterprise partnership was 
never seriously countenanced, largely for contextual reasons (Roche 
1997). For the best part of forty years, successive Governments, ir-
respective of political hue, have followed an unbridled policy of 
economic openness. The main plank of this policy was the attrac-
tion of multinationals to the country. Introducing legislation that 
would require organisations to introduce enterprise partnership was 
seen as increasing labour market regulation in the country thus 
jeopardising the attractiveness of the country as a location for for-
eign direct investment. At the same time, it was recognised that en-
terprise partnership would be unlikely to get diffused widely with-
out some level of public policy support precisely because of the 
market failure identified by Freeman and Lazear (1995).  
 
Thus as a substitute for mandatory rules a new agency was estab-
lished called the National Centre for Partnership (NCP) to promote 
the introduction of social partnership arrangements at the organisa-
tional level.  This centre was to work in four ways. The first was to 
encourage the creation of networks of companies that had set up or Teague: Social Partnership and the Enterprise 11 
were in the process of setting up enterprise partnerships. It was en-
visaged that creating connections of this kind would allow manag-
ers and employers from different companies to share experiences 
and to learn from each other so that each would be a better position 
to solve problems associated with building partnership. No illusion 
existed about the need for both managers and employees to require 
intensive training to operate properly enterprise partnership. The 
second function of the new centre was to engage in research and 
dissemination activity.  Enterprise partnership networks would be 
closely monitored so that ‘best practice’ diagnostic instruments and 
training modules could be devised that would the spreading of these 
arrangements to other companies. In addition, a variety of focused 
research projects were to be sponsored to deepen understanding of 
the partnership process in action – for example throwing light on 
the extent to which employee and management attitudes change 
with the introduction of collaborative employment practices.  
 
A third function was to act as a verifier to the enterprise partnership 
process. Very often both employees and managers inside organisa-
tions seek assurance from external agents before creating enterprise 
partnerships. Managers want to be confidant that these arrange-
ments can bring improvements to competitive performance whereas 
trade unions seek reassurance that delivering better working condi-
tions will be part of the agenda. The new centre would work with 
each party to show how partnership could advance competitiveness 
and fairness inside the organisation. In addition, the Centre would 
give its imprimatur to various training agencies which organisations 
and trade unions interpreted as a quality standard. The main em-
ployer and trade union organisations, IBEC and ICTU, augmented 
this role of the centre by creating several companies to provide ad-
visory and facilitation services for organisations. An important side 
effect of as such activity is that it guaranteed organised labour a 
central role in the support framework for enterprise partnerships. 
 
The fourth function of the centre was to experimental public policy. 
For the most part, this would involve the NCP co-ordinating new 
joint action by different arms of government and semi-public bodies 
to advance partnership at enterprise level. In its early years, the 
NCP did not live up to its initial billing. The core problem was that 
it had too few staff to carry out the tasks that it was set. In 2000 the 12  European Political Economy Review  
 
organisation was revamped without the portfolio of activities that it 
was initially given being touched. It was renamed the National Cen-
tre for Partnership and Performance (NCPP), given more staff and 
extra resources and reorganized so that activities could be devel-
oped in a more dedicated way. These changes have lead to a more 
focused and concerted drive to diffuse enterprise partnership. 
 
All in all, the NCP and its successor the NCPP can be considered an 
instrument of ‘soft’ regulation rather than hard law (see Ogus 
2000). On the one hand, it underscores the importance of building a 
public framework to address market (and institutional) failures in an 
employment system: the governance of the employment relation-
ship is not left solely to employers. On the other hand, it departs 
from the traditional social democratic model of labour market co-
ordination, which relies heavily on constraining laws and proce-
dures. The work of the NCP was very much orientated towards de-
veloping ‘enabling’ schemes rather than relying on constraining 
rules. Pragmatic problem solving between managers and employees 
was encouraged, as was any initiative that promoted consensus 
building employment relations at the workplace. Collective bargain-
ing of an adversarial kind as well as other forms of mobilisation that 
encouraged a ‘them and us’ employment relations mentality were 
not supported. To a large extent the NCPP can be considered an ex-
ercise in deliberative governance which seeks to advance public 
policy objectives through informed debate and preference-changing 
dialogue (Elster 1998). The collection and interpretation of evi-
dence to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of programmes are 
also regarded as important by this approach. Flexible policy-making 
and consensus-building activities are the two mainstays of the ac-
tivities of the NCPP. These are attractive features as some of limita-
tions of an excessively legalistic approach to the governance of the 
employment are circumvented. Yet as the evidence below will show 
seeking to establish partnership based management-employee inter-
actions without any legal framework can run into major difficulties. 
 
 
4.   The Spread of Enterprise Partnerships in Ireland 
 
Because enterprise partnerships have developed in quite different 
ways in the public and private sectors it is appropriate to discuss the Teague: Social Partnership and the Enterprise 13 
two spheres separately. With regard to the private sector, there has 
been no systemic research on the diffusion of enterprise partner-
ships, but it is safe to say there has been no widespread adoption of 
these arrangements (McCartney/Teague 2004). Moreover, the open 
definition of enterprise partnerships and the subsequent attachment 
of 'partnership' to this definition have made more difficult the col-
lection of any reliable data on this topic. Thus, for example, one 
possible option is to measure the extent of enterprise partnership by 
counting the number of enterprise level agreements that covered 
some or all of these issues. This is the approach adopted by the 
largest trade union in Ireland, the Services, Industrial, Professional 
and Technical Union (SIPTU). Its research department collects in-
formation on enterprise level agreements that cover certain ‘partner-
ship issues’ that the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF) 
(see below) identified as ‘suitable partnership topics’ (Government 
of Ireland 1996: 53; 2000: 16). A summary of these agreements by 
partnership issue signed by the union between 1996- 2001 is pre-
sented in Table 1 below. 
 
 
Table 1: Partnership Agreements Achieved by SIPTU                                    
under P2000 and PPF 
 
Partnership Issue  P2000  PPF 
Employee Involvement  5  1 
Training and Support  32  2 
Equality of Opportunity  39  4 
Representative Arrangements  39  3 
Financial Involvement  83  15 
Composition of Workforce  8  3 
New Forms of Work Organisation  58  7 
Health and Safety  14  3 
Conflict Resolution  7  3 
Adaptability Flexibility etc.  25  1 
Tax Breaks  2  1 
 
Source:  SIPTU Research. 
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These figures show that during the period SIPTU completed 355 
separate agreements covering 72,000 members. Most of these 
agreements relate to the substantive areas of financial involvement 
(gainsharing, profit sharing etc.) and new forms of work organisa-
tion. 
 
While these figures are impressive, care must be taken not to over-
state the true extent of enterprise level partnership activity indicated 
by Table 1. For a start, the table only measures agreements that 
cover ‘partnership issues’. It does not follow that all of these 
agreements were necessarily arrived at in a true partnership mode: 
many of the ‘partnership’ deals listed may be little more than exten-
sions of existing collective agreements which were negotiated 
through traditional adversarial bargaining. Furthermore, the table 
includes some agreements that only cover a single issue or a narrow 
set of issues. Clearly these agreements represent a lesser form of 
partnership. 
 
One further point of interpretation is that these figures are not an 
exhaustive inventory of enterprise partnership activity in Ireland. 
Firstly, they only include partnership deals concluded by SIPTU on 
behalf of its members. Therefore they do not take account of part-
nership deals between employers and other unions, and of agree-
ments between employers and employees in non-unionised estab-
lishments. Moreover, the above statistics only cover formalised 
agreements, and therefore ignore any informal partnership activities 
that exist at enterprise level. At the very least, however, the table 
shows that SIPTU, the country's largest union is engaging heavily 
with partnership type issues at organisational level. And even if 
some of these agreements have quite a narrow orientation the poten-
tial is likely to exist for quite a number to develop into more power-
ful and far reaching partnerships. 
 
An alternative way of measuring partnership activity is to look at 
the use of some modern work practices associated with a more par-
ticipatory mode of employee relations. Figures on the percentage of 
establishments using specific partnership type practices are presented 
in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2: The Incidence of Participatory Work Practices in Ireland 
(Percentage of Establishments Adopting Each Practice) 
 
Survey  Job 
Rotation 
Team 
Working 
Ad hoc 
Off-Line 
Task 
Forces
2 
TQM  Just-in-
Time 
On-Line 
Mainten
ance 
On-
Line 
Quality 
European 
Foundation 
(1997) 
__ 42.0  36.0  __  __ __ __ 
IBEC (1999)  __  63.0  37.0  37.0  33.0  __  54.0 
Doherty 
(1998)  __ 27 70  __  __  __  __ 
McCartney 
and Teague 
(2004) 
56.9 27.5 44.1  68.7  48.3  39.2  57.8 
Roche and 
Geary (2000)  __ 59.0  45.5  71.1  __ __ __ 
 
 
A number of points are notable from this table
3. One is that there 
appears to be widespread experimentation with new forms of work 
practices that also overlap with partnership type practices in Irish 
establishments. Another is that most practices are used in a minimum 
of around 35% of establishments, and this rises considerably when we 
consider quality related practices such as TQM and on-line Quality 
                                                 
2   Occasionally a distinction is drawn between permanent and ad hoc consulta-
tive mechanisms. McCartney and Teague view Quality Circles as ad hoc ar-
rangements. However, the European Foundation and Roche and Geary use 
this label to describe ongoing mechanisms, preferring the label “Ad Hoc Task 
Forces” to describe occasional consultative groups. For consistency, the above 
table re-labels McCartney and Teague’s previously published Quality Circle 
figure as relating to Ad Hoc Task Forces. 
3   There are two exceptions to this rule. Firstly, team working has adoption fig-
ures ranging from the extremes of 16% (Sinnott 1994) to 63% (IBEC 1999). 
One possible explanation for this is that Sinnott’s data are somewhat older, 
and team working may have diffused further into Irish management practice 
since they were collected. Evidence from the recent UCD Produc-
tion/Operations Management Survey indicates a rapid growth in team work-
ing in the three years prior to 1996 (see Geary 1999: 876). The second excep-
tion is TQM, with adoption estimates ranging from 37% (IBEC) to 71.1% 
(Roche/Geary 1998). This is probably due to the way TQM is defined, with 
IBEC’s definition focusing on ‘soft’ practices, e.g. maximising motivation 
and team spirit rather than on the concrete objectives of eliminating defects 
and getting things right first time (see IBEC 1999: p.17). 16  European Political Economy Review  
 
Control. While the diffusion of workplace innovation is high, 
indicating that many employers are experimenting with participatory 
work practices, it is also important to examine the nature of the 
changes that are taking place. One way of doing this is to look at the 
proportion of their employees that firms are involving in these 
‘partnership practices’. 
 
Two of our surveys provide data on the workforce penetration of 
partnership type practices, and these are reported in Table 3 below.  
 
 
Table 3: The Percentage of Establishments With 50% or More                                    
of Their Employees Engaged in Each Practice
4 
 
Survey Team  Working  Ad hoc                
Off-Line Teams  TQM Job  Rotation 
 
McCartney and 
Teague 
 
64.3 71.1 79.1  54.2 
EPOC 58 73 __  __ 
 
 
  Sources: Special tabulations by John McCartney, European Foundation (1997: 66). 
 
 
This table shows that the majority of the establishments 
experimenting with new forms involve more than half of their 
employees.  
 
A further way of assessing the depth of change in Irish work practices 
is to examine how far-reaching the partnership practices are in terms 
of content. A key indicator of this is the level and scope of employ-
ees’ decision making authority within teams. Several surveys have 
collected information on this matter which is compiled in Table 4. 
 
                                                 
4   The reported figures are percentages of the establishments that actively use 
each practice. Teague: Social Partnership and the Enterprise 17 
Table 4: The Levels of Autonomy Permitted to Team Members 
 
Area of Decision Making 
% of Workplaces Which Give Team Members Decision 
Making Rights 
  UCD
5  Doherty  EPOC (10 Coun-
try Average) 
Allocation of Work  41  __  47 
Scheduling of Work  47  33  53 
Assessing/Resolving Problems 
With Other Teams 
36 __ 39 
The Quality of Work  71  __  40 
Improving Work Processes  90  34  53 
Attendance and Absence Control  32  16  29 
Time Keeping Control  51  16  42 
Selection of Team Members  15  14  __ 
Selection of Team Leader 
Develop Budgets 
Deal with Behavioural/Discipli-
nary Matters 
24 
__ 
__ 
__ 
9 
8 
__ 
__ 
__ 
 
 
A number of points arise from this table. First of all, some estab-
lishments which have adopted team working are delegating signifi-
cant amounts of decision making authority to employees at ground 
level. Moreover, companies that use team working give a signifi-
cant proportion of employees the right to engage in process devel-
opment without referring back to management. Yet another finding 
is that substantial numbers of work teams are given control of qual-
ity activities and the authority to schedule their own work. This is 
clearly in keeping with the principle of delegating decision making 
to those with the most day-to-day experience. Finally, employers are 
more willing to delegate decision-making authority on practical opera-
tional matters. However, they are less willing to loosen their tight con-
trol on ‘management prerogative’ issues such as attendance, discipli-
nary matters and budgeting. 
 
Of course caution must be used in interpreting these figures. An un-
resolved matter is whether delegation is unambiguously positive 
(Geary 1999). Along with new decision making rights comes extra 
responsibility, and it can be argued that team working may be used 
to squeeze more effort out of individual employees. Thus, the extent 
                                                 
5   The reported values refer to whether team members play the leading role in 
making decisions. This may be a more restrictive definition than those of the 
other surveys, possibly resulting in lower values (Source: Geary 1999: 877). 18  European Political Economy Review  
 
to which team working represents a far-reaching form of partner-
ship, rather than just a management tool for increasing efficiency, is 
open to debate. On the other hand, it is clear that decision-making 
rights rather than simple consultation “privileges” are being dele-
gated to workers within teams. This is significant insofar as it indi-
cates a definite (if sometimes limited) recasting of the relationship 
between management and employees, and as such it would be inac-
curate to dismiss these developments as unimportant.  
 
 
5.  The institutional character of private sector enterprise 
partnerships 
 
An influential idea in the economics of organisations is that enter-
prises should strive for complementarity between structures, prac-
tices and procedures. (Milgrom/Roberts 1992) The thinking is 
straightforward enough: organisations where a strong ‘fit’ exists be-
tween different competencies are more likely to steal a march on ri-
vals. Complementarity allows the collective impact of competencies 
to be greater than the sum of the individual parts. Aoki (1994) used 
this approach to deepen understanding of the dynamics of the Japa-
nese firm. The thinking also has left a strong imprint on the litera-
ture about the diffusion of high performance HRM practices. A fea-
ture of this literature is the assumption, even belief, that it is more 
advantageous to introduce new work practices in bundles.  The lit-
erature on enterprise partnership has also been influenced by these 
ideas (Kochan 1999).  Thus for any arrangement of this ilk to be ro-
bust and properly ‘embedded’ it must involve a series of interde-
pendent and mutually reinforcing changes. The significance of this 
approach is that introducing enterprise partnerships must involve 
transformative organisational change (Guest and Peccei 1998).  
 
But the development of enterprise partnership in Ireland does not 
fully chime with this theoretical perspective. A more appropriate 
framework for the interpretation of the Irish experience is the evolu-
tionary view of the firm which sees organisations develop through a 
process of guided evolution whereby new practices are introduced 
incrementally and tried and tested procedures mutate (Nelson and 
Winter 1982). A core operating assumption behind the fostering of 
enterprise partnership in Ireland is that these arrangements have dif-Teague: Social Partnership and the Enterprise 19 
High          
Commitment   
HRM policies 
ferent starting points and advance at different speeds. In institu-
tional terms, interviews with trade unions, employers and public of-
ficials who are actively involved on this matter as well as some se-
lective case-studies suggest that some the ‘best’ enterprise partner-
ships some of the following design features (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: (Loose) Design Features of Enterprise Partnerships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enterprise partnership is normally set up by an agreement involving 
management and employee (usually trade union) representatives. 
This agreement sets down the institutional character of the envis-
aged arrangement. It is normally signed only after management and 
Direct Participation 
Overarching 
Partnership 
Committee 
Projects 
Collective 
Bargaining 20  European Political Economy Review  
 
unions have carried out a lengthy diagnostic review. A diagnostic 
review is a set of procedures which organisations use to give man-
agement and unions a better understanding of the type of partner-
ship agreement an organisation can 'hold' in prevailing commercial 
circumstances. Furthermore, it is an opportunity for employees and 
management to forge a consensus about the shape and character of a 
prospective partnership deal. A partnership agreement is less an 
elaborated model of how the organisation should be and more the 
institutional expression of the consensus reached by management 
and employees during the diagnosis review. At the same time a 
partnership agreement usually sets up a company-wide partnership 
forum or committee. Invariably, the partnership forum established is 
an overarching, open-ended, arrangement charged with the respon-
sibility of initiating, co-ordinating and reviewing partnership activ-
ity. 
 
To advance these objectives, partnership committees frequently es-
tablish sub-groups or projects. Case-study evidence suggests that 
well functioning sub-groups are the engine room of a successful en-
terprise partnership. Project groups work on matters such as reform-
ing the company pension scheme, devising a new financial partici-
pation arrangement, and establishing the ground rules for the intro-
duction of new employment practices such as team-working. By 
working on specific tasks, or attempting to invent solutions to 
agreed problems, these bodies drive purposeful joint action between 
management and employers. Sub-groups, which encourage man-
agement and employees to search for superior ways of doing things, 
make enterprise partnership simultaneously process and task driven: 
the boundary between process and outcome becomes blurred. The 
implication of this approach is that fairness at work can only be 
agreed, analysed and changed if it can be translated into practices 
that guide actual behaviour.  
 
The emerging ‘model’ of enterprise partnership stands apart from, 
but nevertheless is associated with both the ‘works council’ and 
‘HRM’ approaches to employee involvement and participation. 
These two established approaches use distinctive and contrasting 
practices and procedures to organise the employment relationship. 
First, work councils are representative and indirect forms of worker 
participation, and thus epitomise collective employment relations. Teague: Social Partnership and the Enterprise 21 
In contrast, HRM approaches espouse decentralised forms of in-
volvement that tend to focus on the individual. Thus it lays greater 
stress on direct forms of involvement. Second, whereas work coun-
cils cover strategic matters as well as operational and implementa-
tion matters, HRM tends to concentrate on the last two matters. 
Third, an important function of work councils, at the least in the 
German model, is to oversee the implementation of substantive and 
procedural rights proscribed in German labour law whereas the 
HRM model is about solving problems that arise in the day-to-day 
running of the business or productive system. Fourth, work councils 
are mandatory institutions in the sense that managers are obliged by 
law to follow a proscribed list of rules and procedures when con-
sulting with employees. HRM, on the other hand, is an instrument 
which leaves the depth and scope of any employee involvement 
scheme more or less in the hands of the managerial team. Fifth, the 
‘value system’ underpinning works councils is integrative bargain-
ing whereas HRM is heavily orientated towards ‘empowerment’ 
and performance (see Muller-Jentsch 1995 and Schuler and Jackson 
1999). 
 
The ‘Irish’ version of enterprise partnership contains elements of 
each approach, but cannot be considered a full-blown version of ei-
ther. It interfaces with both approaches. On the one hand, it is fully 
compatible with new employment practices such as direct participa-
tion or team-working, total quality management and job rotation. At 
the same time, there is a collective and strategic dimension to its ac-
tivities. Thus, for example, project or sub groups of the enterprise 
partnership have the potential to deal with matters that are once re-
moved from the immediate operation of the business and have far-
reaching implications for the organisation as a whole – a new pen-
sion scheme or a new system of work-sharing for example. To 
properly design and introduce such work innovations requires man-
agers to share information of a strategic kind with employees 
(Easton et al 2000). At first blush, the Irish model is nearer to the 
HRM model when we consider the matter of mandatory rules. But 
this is less the case now with the recent adoption of the new EU Di-
rective on information and consultation rights of employees. Al-
though this law falls short of the German co-determination legisla-
tion, it nevertheless establishes a broad legal framework for em-
ployee involvement. Management has no longer a unilateral pre-22  European Political Economy Review  
 
rogative on this matter in any of the member-states. All in all, the 
value system of the Irish version of enterprise partnerships is a hy-
brid of the work councils and HRM approaches as it seeks im-
proved organisational performance and competitiveness through 
procedures and relationships closely associated with integrated bar-
gaining (Walton et al 1994).  
 
In Ireland little attempt has been made to use enterprise partnership 
to substitute, supplant or wither away established collective bar-
gaining procedures. It is not the case that once an enterprise partner-
ship arrangement is created then management and unions com-
pletely abandon tried and tested mechanisms for governing the em-
ployment relationship. Where both approaches exist in the same or-
ganisation the tendency is for these to sit uneasily together with 
each other. The evidence from Ireland is that it is not possible to 
identify a neat and tidy boundary between the two. Nevertheless, 
the unspoken expectation is that partnership will sooner or later 
modify the approach all sides take to employment relations negotia-
tions, replacing conflictual and adversarial approaches with prob-
lem-solving and co-operative approaches: to use the language of 
Walton and McKersie (1965) partnership will induce a shift from 
distributional to integrative bargaining. Thus the relationship be-
tween collective bargaining, new employment practices and part-
nership procedures differs from organisation to organisation: some-
times the interactions are complementary, in other cases they are 
not. This characteristic reflects the customised nature of enterprise 
partnerships and to some extent corresponds to experience else-
where (see Rubenstein and Kochan 2004 and Easton et al 2003).  
 
 
6.   Understanding Enterprise Partnership in Ireland 
 
Thus the enterprise partnership model unfolding in the Irish private 
seeks to establish a procedural consensus between management and 
unions about how the direction and pace of change should unfold 
inside the organisation (Teague 2004 forthcoming). The idea of en-
terprise partnerships as a procedural consensus has considerable at-
traction but also a major weakness that has limited its diffusion 
within Ireland. Let us first focus on the positive features. One view 
of partnership it that when it is first set up it needs time away from Teague: Social Partnership and the Enterprise 23 
the commercial ‘front-end’ of the organisation so that management 
and workers can develop sufficient confidence in each other when 
facing the vagaries of business life. An uneasiness exists about this 
view in Ireland, largely because it is seen as an overly ‘process’-
driven approach to partnership development. The suspicion is that 
enterprises have neither the time nor resources to engage in such 
trust creating activity. In most circumstances enterprise partnerships 
make a pragmatic trade-off between trust and time. Thus a prefer-
ence has emerged for enterprise partnership to link trust formation 
with ‘hard’ tasks associated with business performance. A ‘surfeit’ 
of trust is not seen as necessary to make enterprise partnership 
meaningful. (Kern 1998). This view is in line with the theoretical 
literature that argues trust between economic or social actors can 
deplete if it is not tested (Gambetta 1988). Regarding enterprise 
partnership as a procedural consensus encourages management and 
workers to jointly analyse problems with a view to forging solutions 
that are acceptable to both (Favereau 1994). 
 
Consider the following example. In many organisations employees 
have greater knowledge about the operational aspects of the busi-
ness than managers. On the other hand, managers have privileged 
access to strategic information, such as market or financial trends, 
which is not always shared with employees. Clearly, it is in the in-
terests of both parties to collude as they have complementary assets 
(Coriat and Dosi 1998). At the same time, collusion cannot be as-
sumed ex ante as neither side will want to sell themselves short. As 
a result, an incentive system needs to exist inside the organisation to 
ensure that information flows freely and is processed effectively 
(Wachter and Whyte 1990). Financial participation is the most 
common instrument used to encourage collusive behaviour. The 
vast majority of enterprise partnerships in Ireland contain a finan-
cial participation plan whether it is in the form of an employee share 
or profit scheme or gain-sharing plan. By introducing a financial 
participation plan, particularly if it is a profit-sharing or share op-
tions arrangement. In so doing the partnership agreement is trying 
to reshape the incentive structure of the organisation so that a 
‘common fate’ is forged between managers and workers (see Go-
mez-Mejia, 2000). 
 
 A sceptic could argue that financial participation could be intro-24  European Political Economy Review  
 
duced without an enterprise partnership agreement. But as fre-
quently pointed out in the literature pay innovations that have been 
jointly designed by managers and unions are more likely to solve 
problems that stand in the way of collusive behaviour between the 
two (Charny 1999). One problem is establishing the variable com-
ponent of the pay package at a level that will have an appreciable 
impact on the attitudes and behaviour of managers and unions with-
out exposing either to excessive risk. Another is to ensure that if 
bad commercial times arrive there is not a hostile backlash from 
employees as they experience a fall in the variable component of 
pay. Potentially enterprise partnership can help organisations meet 
both challenges.  
 
Consider the first problem. No easy to apply formula exists 
whereby a financial participation measure connects incentives to 
motivation. Even a rule of thumb guide appears unsuitable. For ex-
ample, McKersie (1996) has argued that an ESOP needs to provide 
employees with a 12 per cent stake in the company before any dis-
cernible change in their expectations and behaviour can be realisti-
cally expected. While this may be appropriate for some sectors it 
may not be feasible in others. To apply this rule to parts of the 
petro-chemical industry, for example, would turn employees into 
multi-millionaires overnight. Thus, no golden formula exists to 
guide the instalment of pay innovations like ESOP. Diffusion can 
only come about through a process of negotiation and deliberation 
inside the company.  
 
Enterprise partnership facilitates this process for its raison d’etre is 
to prompt collaborative management-employee interactions that 
lead to organisational innovations. It can also be used as a proce-
dure to monitor and evaluate the ESOP or whatever financial meas-
ure may be in place. Finally, it can act as the arena for the settle-
ment of disputes that may arise about the operation of a financial 
participation arrangement. Thus partnership is a piece of employ-
ment relations machinery that speaks to the diverse objectives of 
agents inside the organisation. It sets in train active procedures and 
relationships that continually challenge management and employees 
to modify their behaviour in a manner that benefits both parties. The 
desired outcome is more likely to be the embedding of reward sys-
tems that balances fairness and performance inside the organisation Teague: Social Partnership and the Enterprise 25 
better than more orthodox schemes. 
 
Thus on paper viewing enterprise partnerships as a procedural con-
sensus has merit. But it would be misleading to say that fully ma-
ture or what might be called pristine partnerships have spread 
widely in Ireland.  The main problem is that while a procedural 
consensus helps address the difficulties associated with obtaining 
genuine joint action by management and trade unions it cannot sur-
mount what can be called the partnership trilemma. An enterprise 
partnership is unlikely to function in a full fashion manner if man-
agers insist that developing partnership cannot intrude into their 
right to manage, where unions insist that partnership must be kept at 
arms length form collective bargaining activity and yet partnership 
is given a mandate to bring about meaningful cooperative interac-
tions at the workplace. To create an employment system inside a 
company that contains all three properties is a recipe for either 
deadlock or for weak partnership arrangements (Marks et al 1998).  
 
A procedural consensus can help develop pragmatic arrangements 
in the face of this trilemma, but it is unlikely to resolve it fully, at 
least not in a sustainable. The import from this assessment is that 
enterprise partnership irrespective of organizational form and stage 
of development must be considered by management to be more that 
a device to secure employee cooperation for management devised 
corporate strategies. For its part, organised labour must recognise 
that for a partnership arrangement to work it most actively and 
meaningfully engage with management to seek solutions to business 
problems. If these two preconditions are not present an enterprise 
partnership is going to struggle to reach full maturity (Guest and 
Pecceci 2001).   
 
 
7. Enterprise Partnerships in the Public Sector  
 
Much of the philosophy driving the creation of enterprise partner-
ships in the private sector has been behind the setting up of similar 
arrangements in the public sector. Thus there is much talk of ‘enter-
prise’ partnerships in the public sector being a vehicle for the mod-
ernisation of service delivery and new collaborative forms of work 
between managers and employees. At the same time, there are im-26  European Political Economy Review  
 
portant differences in terms of context and experience that merit the 
diffusion of partnership arrangements in the public sector to be ex-
amined separately. Like the private sector, the big move to creating 
organisational partnership occurred in Partnership 2000. This na-
tional social agreement outlined six principles that should guide the 
diffusion of partnership principles into different parts of the public 
sector.  These were ensuring better quality in the delivery of ser-
vices, effective performance management at all levels, flexibility in 
the deployment of resources, training and development, the effec-
tive use of ICT and an open participative approach (Government, 
1996; 69) Thus  partnership was viewed as being intrinsic to the 
process of organisational change in the public sector. 
 
A three tier institutional structure was envisaged for organisational 
partnerships in the public sector. In the Civil Service, for example, 
an overarching partnership body was set up at the centre to guide 
and monitor partnership-led activity in the sector.  The work of the 
body was to be largely strategic in character. In particular, it was to 
ensure that a link existed between the activities of partnership ar-
rangement and the wider programme for public sector modernisa-
tion known as the Strategic Management initiative. In addition the 
central body to monitor progress of lower level partnership commit-
tees and to address problems of any significance that had crept into 
the process. At the intermediate level, each department was to cre-
ate a partnership management committee. Every departmental part-
nership management committee was given a fair degree of auton-
omy to decide its own organisational form, but each was mandated 
to develop a modernisation strategy to customise the implementa-
tion of nationally or centrally agreed policies and initiatives. In the 
civil service there are 32 different departments and thus it was ex-
pected that 32 partnership committees would be formed in this part 
of the public sector .At the ground level, each Division or even 
work section was to have its own partnership committee to agree a 
programme of action for the immediate working environment. Thus 
the partnership structure inside the public sector was seen as having 
top-down and bottom-up dimensions that would lead to a compre-
hensive, inter-linked process of organisational change. 
 
Successive national social agreement have put in place a range of 
incentives for both managers and workers to set-up and operate this Teague: Social Partnership and the Enterprise 27 
institutional framework for social partnership. Thus Partnership 
2000 contained a local bargaining clause for public service workers 
which allowed for additional increases of up to 2% in the third 
phase of the public service pay plan.  This increase would be con-
tingent on public sector employees helping to create the appropriate 
institutional mechanisms for partnerships in their respective areas of 
work. A slightly tougher incentive regime was written into the sub-
sequent national social agreement the Programme for Prosperity and 
Fairness (PPF) signed in 2001. Whereas, the local bargaining in-
crease was effectively tied the creation of partnership committees in 
the previous agreement, this time around the local increase, which 
was set at 4 per cent, was only to be paid after it was shown that the 
workings of the partnership committees had lead to some form of 
modernisation or improvement in service delivery. Thus each part-
nership committee had to submit a local action plan in the first year 
of the agreement that would detail the modernisation initiative to be 
enacted and then in the following write a report showing whether or 
not change actually occurred. A quality assurance body consisting 
of private sector managers and employees assessed the various 
plans to assess if the changes embarked upon warranted the pay-
ment of the 4 per cent. The consensus is that this arrangement did 
not produce significant progress even though virtually all public 
sector workers received the local award. 
  
Equally it is widely agreed that for all the talk of the partnership 
framework acting as conduit for public sector modernisation, it has 
been a process dominated activity, achieving little in terms of con-
crete outputs. For example, a recent report that evaluated the func-
tioning of partnership committees in the civil service reached a 
number of conclusions (O'Dywer et al 2002). First of all, the part-
nership committees that have been created have failed to establish a 
distinctive identity and a clarity of purpose, causing both managers 
and employees to be uncertain about the role and objectives of these 
arrangements. Second, differing views exist about the effectiveness 
of partnership arrangements. On the one hand, senior managers and 
trade unions were of the view that most partnership committees 
successfully completed designated tasks. On the other hand, middle-
ranking managers and employees considered partnership processes 
to be slow and cumbersome. Third, views also differed amongst un-
ion and management about how partnership arrangements should 28  European Political Economy Review  
 
evolve, particularly in regard to the institutional configuration these 
bodies should take and the relationships that should be established 
collective bargaining procedures. All in all, the  report suggested 
that while advances have been made the partnership process has yet 
to reach full potential.  
 
Overall, the unfolding of partnership arrangements in the public 
sector has fallen short of initial expectations. Opinion differs as to 
the cause of this gap between expectation and actual experience. A 
popular view is that both public sector managers and trade unions 
have not displayed the required level of leadership and commitment 
to make the partnership experiment a success. But this is not an en-
tirely satisfactory explanation.  A more plausible reason is that the 
development of partnership bodies was tied to the programme for 
public sector modernisation without being sufficiently connected to 
the prevailing collective bargaining or people management regimes 
inside the public sector.  But it is precisely by influencing collective 
bargaining behaviour or by helping in the design and delivery of 
new human resource policy that partnership arrangements can help 
address barriers to improved organisational performance. Thus for 
example partnership arrangements could be used to promote inte-
grative forms of bargaining in situations whereby adversarial rela-
tionships are causing repeated and costly collisions between manag-
ers and unions.  
 
Allowing respective collective bargaining, human resource man-
agement and partnership channels to operate more or less independ-
ent from one another inside an organisation is a recipe for confu-
sion. In the Irish case, it has lead to the underdevelopment of the 
partnership channel, causing management and trade unions to con-
tinue with established ways of doing things so to avoid uncertainty 
(Turner et al 2003). In this situation, clarion calls for greater man-
agement and trade union leadership in support of enterprise partner-
ship are unlikely to cut much ice. The big lesson from the Irish pub-
lic sector experience is that partnership principles have to be applied 
clearly and consistently at all levels of the organizations and a 
transparent and widely understood connection has to exist between 
the partnership framework, mainstream collective bargaining and 
the management of the employment relationship. This is not hap-
pening at the moment in Ireland. If partnership is going to be the Teague: Social Partnership and the Enterprise 29 
vehicle for the delivery of public sector modernization, then there 
has to a systematic rethink about its organizational design and pur-
pose. Roche (2002) neatly sums up the situation when he argues 
that the Irish public sector is in need of ‘second-generation partner-
ships’. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
Enterprise partnerships are unlikely to emerge as a new widely 
adopted framework for organisational level employment systems in 
Ireland, at least if current circumstances remain unchanged. These 
arrangements fall short of this status because they have not spread 
sufficiently in the private sector and have ran into deep problems in 
the public sector. Nevertheless, it is an experiment that is interesting 
not least because it is an institutional manifestation of what Streeck 
has called competitive solidarity.  According to Streeck, intensified 
market pressures, experienced almost everywhere, are causing a 
shift from protective and redistributive to productive and competi-
tive forms of solidarity. This shift is happening in virtually all 
spheres of social and economic governance, not least in employ-
ment relations systems. In Europe, the new social pacts that have 
emerged in several countries are less an institutional expression of 
class compromise and more an attempt to align labour market be-
haviour with the dynamics of deeper market and monetary integra-
tion in the EU. At the enterprise level, even the most advanced 
forms of employee involvement are undergoing change. Twenty 
years ago German works councils enforced a range of substantive 
employment rights and permitted workers to be the 'co-managers' of 
the internal labour market. Increasingly these now act as a forum for 
management and unions, at least those unions that represent insider 
employees, to develop agreed corporate strategies.  Thus we have 
institutional continuity at the same time as transformation in func-
tion. 
 
Enterprise partnership in Ireland is an institutional variant of this 
broader, one could even say global, trend towards competitive soli-
darity. The trend is for these arrangements to emphasise competi-
tiveness and organisational performance rather than fairness and ris-
ing living standards. As a result, enterprise partnership cannot be 30  European Political Economy Review  
 
regarded as an example of old style industrial democracy. At the 
same time, it adds up to more than mainstream human resource 
management. For a start, enterprise partnership offers a challenge to 
the leadership model of organisational change that pervades the 
management literature on the topic. In stylised form, the leadership 
model emphasises the actions of an elite group of managers in 
bringing about performance improvement. But strict adherence to 
this model can produce negative side effects inside organisations. 
First of all, over-ambitious managers eager to stamp their presence 
on organisations may find the 'vision thing' too enticing and inflict 
unwarranted levels of change. Another problem is that managers 
seeking to display leadership qualities may engage in cavalier dele-
gation practices that cause resentment and disengagement amongst 
employees. In these circumstances, information-sharing and close 
collaboration between managers and employees become more diffi-
cult. Managerial unilateralism of this kind is challenged by enter-
prise partnership through encouraging a more inclusive approach to 
the change process. In other words, enterprise partnership holds out 
the promise of an employee influence over the pace and direction of 
change at the workplace. In the current climate this is no small mat-
ter. 
 
Another feature of the Irish model of enterprise partnership that 
marks it apart from standard Human Resource Management (HRM) 
practices is that it prevents the management of the employment rela-
tionship being squeezed out of the public domain and internalised 
within organisations. It re-affirms that the rights and responsibilities 
used to incorporate people into the world of work remain a legiti-
mate arena for public intervention and not simply a matter of pri-
vate contract.  But the problem is that the public interventions used 
to advance enterprise partnership have been of the soft regulation 
variety. Many of these interventions, have been necessary and 
worthwhile. Greater understanding of how to work in a partnership 
manner has occurred due to the activities of the NCPP and other 
similar initiatives. Yet these have not been sufficient to induce 
greater buy-in from employers, or trade unions for that matter, to 
the partnership approach.  
 
The Irish experience suggests that attempting to provide public sup-
port for enterprise partnership in the absence of a legal framework Teague: Social Partnership and the Enterprise 31 
does not lead to widespread diffusion. A more appropriate way mat-
ter is to promote partnership in the shadow of the law. In a nutshell 
without some form of statutory provision on employee involvement 
the partnership approach to management-trade union interactions is 
going to remain an exception rather than the rule. One possibility is 
that the newly adopted EU Directive on Information and Consulta-
tion may provide the much-needed legal framework. Ireland does 
not have to comply fully with the Directive until March 2008 and 
the necessary enabling legislation that will introduce this piece of 
European law into domestic law has still to be written. Thus it is too 
early to say how entreprise partnership will be influenced by this 
change in the legal context. At the moment the conclusion has to be 
that promoting enterprise partnerships in Ireland has been an inter-
esting experiment, but one in need of rescue. 
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